A properly structured inquiry could assist Israel in comprehending how such a massive disaster occurred and in preventing its recurrence.
The nation seeks an impartial examination of the October 7 breakdowns. Thus, the Ministerial Committee for Legislation's Monday approval of a new investigative framework appears to be progress, correct?
Incorrect.
Rather than bringing Israel nearer to solutions, the government's action has reignited a damaging conflict—not about the outcomes of an investigation that hasn't started, but about who will lead it.
An inquiry commission is not a cure-all. It cannot mend the wounds of October 7, revive the lost, repair the shattered security in border areas, or remove the trauma now ingrained in the national consciousness.
Yet it remains a crucial instrument in the national recovery toolkit. When correctly established, it can aid Israel in grasping how such a large-scale catastrophe was permitted and how to avert future occurrences.
If improperly set up, it may become just another battlefield in Israel's endless internal wars, which, regrettably, seems to be the current direction.
The legislation, introduced by Likud MK Ariel Kallner and slated for a preliminary Knesset vote this week, would create a "national state investigation committee," differing from a formal state Commission of Inquiry under current law.
Committee composition remains undetermined
According to the plan, the investigative group would be formed by the Knesset and government, not by the Supreme Court president, as with a state Commission of Inquiry.
The committee would consist of six members. The bill initially allows the Knesset two weeks to appoint them through broad agreement, needing 80 MKs' support. If this fails, the coalition and opposition would each select three members. Should the opposition decline to participate—as already signaled—the appointment power would go to Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana, a Likud member.
Critics contend this backup plan might leave the committee fully under coalition control.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has explicitly stated his opposition to a Supreme Court president-appointed state Commission of Inquiry. He argues such a body would be seen as biased and predetermined by at least half the country. In contemporary Israel, this is a genuine concern. Persistent political assaults on the judiciary—led by Netanyahu himself—have severely damaged public trust among many on the Right.
Compounding this is Supreme Court President Yitzhak Amit's role, whose appointment earlier this year was politically contentious, further hardening positions. The Right maintains that Amit and the judiciary must also be scrutinized, given past court decisions on security, Gaza, and military matters, and thus should not choose committee members.
Conversely, opponents of a government-appointed committee present a strong argument: those under investigation should not select their investigators. Netanyahu was prime minister on October 7 and has led for about 15 of the last 17 years. Any inquiry whose scope or makeup is decided by the current coalition will inevitably be viewed as self-serving, covering up, or diverting blame.
Nevertheless, despite both sides' forceful arguments, they overlook a key point.
Does Netanyahu's judicial distrust hold merit?
The core issue isn't whether Netanyahu's distrust of the judiciary is justified, or whether the opposition is right to demand that investigated parties not appoint investigators. The real question is whether any inquiry whose very formation is disputed from the start can fulfill the nation's required role.
An inquiry commission aims not to settle political scores but to rebuild some trust in a system that failed disastrously. That trust cannot be restored if half the country rejects the findings before the investigation begins. Even the broadest investigative powers will be meaningless if results are dismissed as partisan from the outset.
However, there are paths forward from this deadlock—if both sides accept that compromise isn't surrender.
One notable suggestion involves forming a commission led by a retired Supreme Court or District Court judge, with members appointed by a small committee representing the judiciary, government, coalition, and opposition. Each commission appointment would need unanimous approval from the appointment committee, ensuring all perspectives are considered.
Such a structure would disappoint hardliners on both sides. It would prevent either the Right or Left from dominating the process. That's exactly the goal. A commission reluctantly accepted by both camps is far more beneficial than one eagerly embraced by one side and outright rejected by the other.
Insights from October 7
This isn't merely a technical discussion about forming an inquiry commission. It's a test of whether Israeli society has learned a vital lesson from October 7.
Author and philosopher Micah Goodman previously described Israel's prewar judicial crisis as a clash between two supreme values. For one group—the pro-reform camp—Israel's Jewish identity was supreme. For the other, its democratic nature was non-negotiable. Compromise was seen as weakness, as only the feeble compromise on core principles.
Then October 7 occurred.
In the immediate aftermath, a new virtue emerged: unity. Protesters who had been shouting at each other weeks earlier found themselves in identical tanks, sleeping in the same tents, facing the same foe. Briefly, it became evident that without unity, there might be neither a Jewish nor a democratic state, because there might be no state at all.
As the war continued, however, that realization and feeling faded, and pre-October 7 divisions resurfaced. That may be unavoidable. But the lessons must not be forgotten, especially the essential need for compromise.
Compromising on an inquiry commission's structure isn't a betrayal of values. It acknowledges that in a deeply split society, achieving truth requires legitimacy. If each side demands complete control of the process, the outcome won't be accountability; it will be stagnation.
The current challenge is whether Israel's leaders—and its opposing political factions—recognize that healing doesn't start with winning an argument over committee appointments. It begins with creating a committee that commands the vast majority's confidence. And reaching that point necessitates compromise.
